Commentary on David Scott’s ‘The Life and Work of Stuart Hall’ by ARC Student Fellow Marc Kagan.

David Scott, On the Problems of Writing Biography.

“What does it mean to write a life, to give intellectual character to a life?” David Scott, Columbia University professor of Anthropology, asked, as he wrestles with a different type of writing than he has done before, a planned biography of Stuart Hall. “Why Hall? Why biography?” As Scott is still grappling with these questions, much of his talk was about the problems he faces rather than his solutions.

An expatriate from Jamaica in his youth, Hall was an early participant in the founding of the British New Left and a leading light in the Cultural Studies and Black Arts movements. He was at the center of debates about identity, neo-liberalism and Thatcherism, the diaspora, Gramsci and Althusser. Yet Hall, Scott said, was a theorist without one big theory or methodology. Rather, he sought to “bend the twig from where it was stuck…. To ask a new kind of question.”

As a very public intellectual, Hall became almost the metaphorical or figurative embodiment of some of these historical conjunctures, their converging and diverging moments. Other intellectuals saw themselves through Hall, or found themselves refracted through Hall’s work. Later in his life, reflecting on his ideas and work in interviews and discussions with Scott, the real and actual Stuart Hall would find himself face to face with the ways he was perceived and represented. As the GC’s own David Nasaw wrote, in the introduction to a group of articles on biography he moderated in 2009, biography shows, “lives in dialectical relationship to the multiple social, political and cultural worlds they inhabit and give meaning to.”[1]

But how to best write this story? Clearly, an intellectual biography of ideas does not capture the largest meaning of Hall’s life. One approach is to place Hall’s work in the context of the succession of intellectual and political movements with which he was engaged. Alice Kessler-Harris has written that biography allows us to see individual or small group agency conflicting or aligning with broader social and political structures; we can see a person fall in and out of fashion with their times. “We will learn something if we watch the weather change, the value systems shift, the storm descend and retreat: as we observe the engaged life struggle to maintain its balance.”[2] Thus, near the end of his life, Scott suggested, Hall engaged less successfully with radical Islam.

A somewhat different approach is to place Hall’s work in the context of his life as a Jamaican entering still-imperial Britain. While Britain made Hall in a way that Jamaica couldn’t or didn’t, Scott is intrigued by the figure of Hall leaving his native land at 18, in 1951, wholly or partially formed by his colonial (family, school, social, and political) experience. Yet, if Scott assesses Hall on the boat, is this already teleological, denying contingency? And if you assume that Hall’s experiences produced a mindset on decolonization, race, and class, how far to cast the net in comparison? In the discussion that followed Scott’s talk, it was noted that Hall’s youthful milieu also produced Derek Walcott and V.S. Naipaul, other products of a British education intended to produce a “civilized” local elite. Following this line of thought further might lead us out of the Empire to the French Caribbean’s Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon, or a back a generation and out of conventional periodization, to C.L.R. James, or across the ocean, to Nehru and Gandhi. These issues also impact on how or whether Scott will place himself in the story, as a Jamaican expatriate of a later generation, yet still, he said, an object of the civilizing mission.

Scott is also enmeshed in the story as a familiar of Hall in his later years, raising issues of distance. In discussion, Scott was asked whether he was in danger of writing a “love letter” to Hall. He responded with a confession that Hall had characterized a Scott communication with him in exactly those terms. Of course, proximity also gives Scott particular insights not always available to the biographer. It allows him the luxury, and also the burden, of weighing the significance when Hall’s and other people’s accounts of the same stories diverged. Hall’s extended interviews with Scott were, in a sense, his own effort to give meaning and coherence to his own life – how much to privilege them? In what ways do the choices Hall made in these discussions provide evaluative grist for the analytic and contextual mill of unpacking Hall’s life? The problem of “I know too much” is obviously a good one to have, yet it imposes fiercer and harder requirements and demands on the author to really see his subject.  

~Marc Kagan.

 

[1] David Nasaw, “AHR Roundtable: Historians and Biography – Introduction,” The American Historical Review. 114, no. 3 (2009): 573.

[2] Alice Kessler-Harris, “Why Biography?,” The American Historical Review. 114, no. 3 (2009): 625.

Mary Gibson, “Is Punishment Gendered? The Case of Modern Italy”. Commentary by ARC Student Fellow, Emily Brooks

“Is Punishment Gendered? The Case of Modern Italy,” Dr. Mary Gibson, Department of History, John Jay College and the Graduate Center, CUNY

Much of the field of prison history has been dominated by a chronological trajectory proposed by Michel Foucault in his seminal work, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Foucault argued that between 1760 and 1840 new punishment regimes developed across the Western world.  These new systems moved away from public violence as the central form of punishment, focusing instead on depriving prisoners of liberty, and targeting the spirit rather than the body as the site of transformation.  Foucault noted that in many nations this shift in punishment was tied to a move into modernity. Political figures and public commentators touted their prisons as architectural examples of the power and order of the state. Foucault and scholars who accept his chronological framework have argued that the development of modern prisons in the Western world was influenced by Enlightenment thinking and correlated with the rise of industrial capitalism and liberal government.  They have also focused almost exclusively on men’s prisons. Dr. Mary Gibson, Professor of History at John Jay College and the Graduate Center, CUNY, complicates this narrative by examining the emergence of modern prisons in Italy and comparing the development of both men’s and women’s prisons. Gibson considers, in a field dominated by the study of male prisoners, what examining women’s prisons can tell historians about the development of modern punishment systems. And more broadly, are different types of punishment gendered?

Gibson uses Rome as a case study since it was both the capital of the Papal States, and subsequently united Italy, as well as a site where many penal institutions were situated.  In examining changes in punishment practices in Rome, she finds that women were the first beneficiaries of a switch from corporal punishment to imprisonment. This switch, which can be first seen at San Michele prison in 1735, predated the unification of Italy by over one hundred years. Women in San Michele prison lived in separate cells, in which they were overseen by a single guard who could monitor all inmates, and worked in a wool factory for half the wages paid to female workers outside of prison walls. Thus, many of the hallmarks of the modern penitentiary; isolation, supervision, and manufacturing work, all appeared in Italy earlier than would be expected according to Foucault’s chronology, but can only be seen when examining women’s prisons as well as men’s.  Gibson argues that the San Michele women’s prison was part of a web of religious authorities and philanthropic efforts used to control people who existed outside of family units. Women, who were considered both weak and dangerous, were the objects of much of this charity.

Gibson notes that over the course of the 19th century the conditions of incarcerated women deteriorated. In San Michele, women were paired together in cells, and in some newer institutions, like the Diocleziane Baths, which housed men and women in separate areas, prisoners lived in dormitories.  This crowding together of prisoners was a move away from the isolation seen as central to modern prison architecture and a regression toward pre-modern organization of space. The work experience also changed as women were now trained, not for manufacturing work, but rather for handwork and other gendered labor that was intended to prepare them to serve within a family.  Although women in San Michele had been paid less than non-incarcerated female workers, they had learned a skill, which could then serve them on the labor market outside of prison walls. The transition in the treatment of imprisoned women was overseen by an order of nuns who ran San Michele starting in 1854.  Even after the emergence of the new Italian secular state, the religious control over women’s prisons was not challenged. Gibson notes that the conditions of women’s prisons did not fundamentally change until right before WWI when a series of articles appeared in print that exposed the treatment of women’s prisoners and the rule of nuns over incarcerated women.

The story of the development of men’s prisons in Rome, Gibson finds, was quite different. In contrast to the creation of institutions like San Michele, modern prisons were not established for men until a century later. Male prisoners served sentences of hard labor, chained to their fellow prisoners, until the late 19th century.  After Italian unification municipal authorities replaced the male section of Diocleziane Baths, with a hard labor camp called Tre Fontane. Supporters of Tre Fontane celebrated outdoor work as well suited to the rural men who comprised the majority of prisoners in the camp, and claimed that this work turned prisoners from brutes into men. This penal camp was closed in 1895 after it was criticized in Parliament, partly due to the extremely high rates of malaria contracted among the prisoners. It was replaced with a cellular prison called Regina Coeli, which was hailed as one of the new institutions that marked the modernization of the city.  Coeli was built by prisoners themselves, suggesting comparisons with the way that convict labor was used in the project of modernizing the American South in the late 19th century.  Eventually campaigns launched by construction workers against prison labor, again a trend with similarities in the American context, succeeded and prison workers moved out of the construction industry and into the business of printing.  Printers were less organized and the printing press in Regnia Coeli became one of the longest running prison industries. As the debate over Tre Fontane and the building of Regina Coeli suggest, by the late 19th century men’s prisons were already sites of reform. The development of men’s prisons, therefore, Gibson argues, followed a different path from that of women’s prisons,

Gibson’s work shows the utility of considering gender in connection with punishment. Through detailed research that included prison statistics such as the numbers of letters prisoners received, and information about work hours and penalties for disobedience, as well as the architectural plans of prisons, Gibson tracks changes in the development and functioning of prisons. By comparing the different trajectories of male and female punishment in Italy, Gibson challenges the revisionist model of prison historiography, which has generally accepted a conception of prison as a masculine space. Her work suggests that punishment can be gendered, and that considering how and why can reveal much about the development and functioning of punishment regimes.

~ Emily Brooks.

Juliet Hooker, “Black Lives Matter and The Paradoxes Of U.S. Black Politics: From Democratic Sacrifice To Democratic Repair”. Commentary by ARC Student Fellow, Jennifer Chmielewski.

What are the costs of enacting “appropriate” democratic politics in the face of systematic racial violence? When white citizens and state institutions betray a pervasive lack of concern for black suffering, is it fair to ask black citizens to make further sacrifices so that white citizens can be comfortable? In her powerful talk on the complex responses to the current Black Lives Matter movement, Juliet Hooker explores the forms of politics that Black citizens can and should pursue.

Hooker explores these questions through meditations on the problem of democratic loss. She begins with Danielle Allen, who argues democratic politics is characterized by loss and that we must manage this loss as citizens. There are always situations in which one must be a loser in democracy so democracies have to conceive of how this plays out. Losses are theoretically justified because they happen “arbitrarily” but in actuality, some groups, like African Americans, disproportionately bear this burden of loss. As a result, Allen turns her analysis to holding up citizens who sacrifice as key to democratic stability. She discusses African Americans who responded to racial terror in the 1960’s through non-violence as exemplary citizens making these necessary sacrifices on behalf of the rest of the population. As you might imagine, Hooker argues that this notion of Black sacrifice is problematic and an unfair burden on Black citizens to make others comfortable at the expense of their own wellbeing and freedom. Furthermore, she argues that the underlying historical and theoretical assumptions on which this notion of black politics as democratic sacrifice is based, does not actually hold up.

Hooker notes that the most popular critique of the current Black Lives Matter protests is that protesters have not always engaged in strict standards of non-violence (as compared to memories of the 1960’s protest movements) as they speak out against police brutality, murder and the racism of the criminal justice system. Yet she discusses how this critique is based on three key problematic assumptions. The first is the reduction of a long history of black activism and black political thought to a very sanitized version of the civil rights movement of the 1960s. In this romantic narrative of the civil rights movement, the U.S. is seen as a forward-moving democracy where political relations are always moving towards racial equality. This narrative serves to shift attention away from Black loss and long struggles of racial justice toward the idea that black politics should be about peaceful repair within the same democratic system. In fact, the reason Martin Luther King and non-violence movements made an impact is because they were set up in contrast to Malcolm X and movements like the Black Panthers. Both types of movements were necessary to move towards racial equality but we only remember and honor a romanticized version of non-violence and the people that made up these movements.

The second assumption is a mistaken theoretical account of white moral psychology that assumes that whites experience positive ethical transformations as a result of exemplary forms of political activism (i.e. nonviolence) by racialized minorities as they respond to racist violence. But Hooker discusses the fact that there is no evidence that this is true, particularly in our current “post-racial” society with a high degree of white resentment against Blacks and Latino/as. Even in the case of Black unarmed children being murdered by police officers, there is a need to portray each victim of brutality as innocent and deserving of care and citizenship rather than focusing on these deaths as part of a racially unjust system.

Finally, Hooker discusses the third assumption as a characterization of non-violent protest as sacrifice, which she points out, does not necessarily correspond with the way participants in black protest movements actually frame their own actions as defiance or resistance. She uses interpretations of an iconic photograph of Dorothy Counts, one of the first Black students involved in desegregation, as an example. In the photo Hooker references, Dorothy is walking to the school, followed by a mob of white protesters. Many readings of this photograph have centered on Black sacrifice, assuming Dorothy is afraid as she engages in this peaceful protest by going to school and refusing to engage with the mob. In fact, however, Hooker shares that Dorothy’s own reading of her actions are those of defiance, not acquiescence: “if you look at the picture the right way, you see what I see. What I see is that all of those people are behind me. They did not have the courage to get up in my face.”

At the end of her talk, Hooker connects these problematic assumptions to the real world consequences that Black Lives Matters protesters today face as (too many) whites call them criminals and consider them unjustified in their deployment of violence (and nonviolence). There is no room for Black anger and outrage. Thus Hooker asserts that, in this context, peaceful acquiescence will not in fact do the job of creating racial justice. Instead, riots (she uses the term purposefully to leverage its discomfort), or “fugitive black politics” might be a better form of democratic repair for African Americans. They may not always be a solution to structural problems and institutionalized injustices, but they do allow black citizens to express their pain and make their losses visible, and Hooker argues they can help us to theorize how engaging in a politics of active resistance might be crucial to achieving racial justice. Responsibility for racial justice does not lie with those who suffer from racism and so we must stop expecting sacrifice to be enough.

Charlotte Brooks, “Citizenship, Extrality, Expatriation: Chinese American Citizens in China’s Treaty Ports”. Commentary by ARC Student Fellow Alisa Algava

How can transnational histories illuminate the dynamics of a racialized nation-state? In what political, legal, and economic contexts might people claim and/or reject citizenship? Who counts as a citizen? In her talk about Chinese American citizens who immigrated to China in the early twentieth century, Charlotte Brooks shared vivid stories of lives left unexamined by historians while also raising questions that critically resonate with contemporary issues of immigration and inequality.

Between 1900 and 1937, one in five Chinese American citizens returned to China with the intention to settle and stay for the rest of their lives. Many were second generation Chinese Americans who, having seen and experienced the individual discrimination and structural inequity resulting from white supremacy in immigration laws, schooling, employment, and housing, anticipated downward social and economic mobility despite their overall educational success in the U.S. system. Almost all eventually resided in China’s Treaty Ports where foreign residents typically benefited from the imposition of unequal/imperialist treaties in both economic opportunity and the rights of extraterritoriality, or extrality, which meant that their crimes and legal disputes would be governed by the laws of their own nations. Many took advantage of an informal version of Chinese citizenship to work, enter Chinese government positions, or sometimes even own land outside of the treaty ports, opportunities not available to foreigners. However, as the lives of those studied by Brooks illustrate, issues of citizenship, race, identity, rights, and belonging intertwined in complex ways for the Chinese Americans attempting to create new lives for themselves and fit into these polarized cities.

One of many stories of inclusion/exclusion, in 1929 an athlete and a lawyer named Wai-yuen “Nick” Char got into a fistfight on a baseball field in the French concession and was accused of injuring a Chinese citizen. Although he lived in the international settlement and believed he was protected, when Nick Char left for business he was arrested, charged with assault, and found guilty. He claimed extrality and the U.S. government demanded his release. But Chinese officials declared that extrality didn’t extend to him because the children of Chinese fathers are Chinese citizens, and, in fact, he had used that criterion to justify his right to practice law. At that point, the U.S. consulate deserted him and he remained in prison for two months. However, Nick Char’s status as an athlete, a lawyer, and a WWI veteran, along with a possible intervention by Chiang Kai-Shek, eventually saved him. He went back to Honolulu and never returned to China.

The United States’ exclusion and abandonment of its own citizens was not unusual in the treaty ports during this time. Within the ultranationalist, anti-immigrant U.S. context in which citizenship was (and still is) narratively, if not legally, defined according to racial and cultural terms, an unmistakable pattern of discrimination surfaces in the stories Brooks uncovered from newspapers, consular records, and immigration records/interviews. For example, by forcing Chinese Americans to communicate only in English, not registering their businesses, or even refusing to grant passport renewals, the U.S. Consulate in Guangzhou regularly and effectively stripped Chinese Americans—but not white Americans—of their citizenship rights and protections without any due process at all. Justifications included statements alleging that Chinese Americans “have little regard for American ideals of institutions” or are “too Chinese” or are “living as a Chinese.” To what extremes the racialized U.S. nation-state will go to protect whiteness is worth examining, both then and certainly now.

Ultimately, Brooks problematizes a dominant assumption in U.S. history and politics—that this country tells the tale of itself as a nation of immigrants, a supposed magnet and light of justice and freedom attracting all—when she asked, “Who wants to leave the United States?” and then answered, “A lot of people it turns out.”

~ Alisa Algava

 

Leslie McCall, “How Americans Think Politically about Economic Inequality”. Commentary by ARC Student Fellow Helen Panagiotopoulos

U.S. commentators on inequality have historically inhabited elite positions in American society. Given their postionality—as academics, journalists, pollsters, and politicians—it is not surprising that political and policy responses to inequality in the U.S. are comprised of three main discourses: (1) the tolerance perspective, which draws on the “American dream” ideology, where hard work will result in “fair” outcomes, (2) the ignorance view, which explains that, even though Americans generally desire less inequality, they are largely unaware of how much it has risen, and (3) the ambivalence approach—adopted by experts in the field that are ambivalent because they are uncertain in how to address it, particularly in regards to racial inequality. Leslie McCall takes up a fourth approach—the opportunity model—in her talk on How Americans Think Politically about Economic Inequality. This perspective arises from the desire for equal opportunity and widespread access to employment and education.

McCall’s discussion of the opportunity model focuses on popular American beliefs about inequality and their political implications. Americans generally believe that income differences are too large, inequality continues to exist to benefit the rich and powerful, and large income differences are unnecessary for prosperity. On the issue of “hard work” and its role in “getting ahead,” the American public continues to buy into this ideology, yet there is broad recognition that there are barriers to opportunity such as parental education, coming from a wealthy family, and knowing the right people. The political implications of these views result in emphasizing the limitations of redistributive models—models that largely rest on elite partisan approaches, such as the conservative tendency to equalize opportunities like economic growth rather than outcomes. Democrats, on the other hand, have focused on “equalizing outcomes” through taxing and social spending, while other alternatives like the Civil Rights model advocate for racial and gender equity by aiming to equalize outcomes. While the Civil Rights model developed approaches to expand education and economic opportunities for groups discriminated against by virtue of their race, ethnicity, or gender, McCall underscores that the anti-discrimination strategy has proven insufficient on its own. Equal opportunities in the workplace and in universities through antidiscrimination policies remain within the opportunity paradigm by equalizing outcomes (through affirmative action) to equalize opportunities.

Responses to inequality have, therefore, focused on opportunities rather than outcomes or government intervention. Tailored to appeal to the American majority, who care more about opportunity than equality, Democrats, too, respond to growing inequality through the opportunity model. Given the political implications of American beliefs about inequality, several questions emerge from McCall’s discussion. How does, for example, the American public define the poor? What populations are left out in this model? What types of employment and opportunities in education exist, for instance, for immigrants in the U.S.? Do antidiscrimination laws protect migrant workers? What are the limitations in opportunities for these groups? Can inequality be addressed without engaging in policy, such as immigration reform? These questions foreground whether there can ever be equality of opportunity for all, an assumption the opportunity model appears to rely on.

Luisa Martin Rojo, “The Impact of the Native-Speaker Model in the Construction of Inequality”. Commentary by ARC Student Fellows Lauren Spradlin and Jennifer Hammano

ARC Distinguished Fellow Luisa Martín Rojo, Professor in Linguistics at the Universidad Autónoma in Madrid, presented her current research project The Impact of the Native-Speaker Model in the Construction of Inequality on November 12. Her presentation focused on what it means to be a ‘native’ speaker of a language and the privileges that come with it, and conversely, how inequality is structured, legitimized, and propagated through prejudices relating to notions of who is a ‘native speaker’ of a language.

Native speakers of a language are typically defined as those who have grown up hearing and speaking that language from birth, though scholars have begun to challenge both the validity of this definition and the concept of ‘native speaker’ altogether. As Martín Rojo expressed, native speakers of a given language are usually considered (by linguists and speech communities alike) to be the models and the authorities on that language. In line with this notion, there is an expectation that all speakers of a language should strive to sound like a local native speaker. Any language users who choose to use structures, words, or sounds that do not conform to the prestige variety as spoken by a native speaker are perceived as ‘non-authentic’ speakers of the language, and are policed by authentic speakers accordingly. Speakers whose language practices are non-nativelike are subjected to linguistic shame, which carries social and economic consequences.

In order to demonstrate how power is exerted using language, language policing linguistic surveillance, and notions of nativeness, Martín Rojo conducted a study on university students in Spain who had migrated at a young age from Latin America. She interviewed university students about their experiences being the subjects of linguistic surveillance, with specific reference to use of /θ/ vs. /s/. /θ/ (used to represent a th-sound) is not used in Latin American Spanish, but is used in the area of Spain where the subjects lived. This is an interesting twist in a study exploring the status of ‘native speaker’ – the speakers who took part in the study were truly native speakers of Spanish, in that they had been speaking Spanish from birth. Yet, their language practices were still ‘othered’ by speakers of the prestige variety of Spanish spoken in Northern Spain.

 

 

 

Amy Chazkel, “The Nocturnal Lives of a Nineteenth Century Brazilian City”. Commentary by ARC Student Fellow Emily B. Campbell

On November 5th, ARC Distinguished Fellow, and Professor of History at The Graduate Center, CUNY and Queens College, Amy Chazkel presented her current research, “The Nocturnal Lives of a Nineteenth Century Brazilian City”. Chazkel offered a detailed portrait of nighttime in Rio de Janeiro, and the socio-legal construction of night during the city’s 53-year long curfew, part of her forthcoming book, tentatively titled, Urban Chiaroscuro: Rio de Janeiro and the History of Nightfall. Chazkel opened the talk by challenging the notion of the night as a time of innate danger, and asked the audience to instead see night as a sociolegal construct of control, policing, curfew and states of siege or exception.

Chazkel emphasized Brazil and Rio de Janeiro as a particularly interesting site, where slavery was not abolished until 1888 and urban modernity and slavery overlapped in profound ways. Drawing on an impressively vast archive of information, Chazkel used travel letters, period paintings, maps, newspapers, public records on the theatre, arrest records, police edicts, among other sources to sketch a portrait of night in Rio at this time, in order to further discussions on modernity and social control. The control of public space through curfews, Chazkel argues, gave way to the novel articulation of the ‘right to the city’ and freedom of movement in public space post-emancipation. Chazkel’s project, has literally been that of pulling out from the shadows, as no explicit archives or materials on nightfall or curfews exist. Fascinatingly, a footnote explaining, “after dark a stick became a weapon” piqued her curiosity and led to this research.

Chazkel explained that Francisco Teixera de Aragão instituted the 53-year curfew in 1825 after the Constitution of 1824 upheld slavery. The curfew was imposed at 10 PM and 9PM in winter months, and was signaled by the unceasing ringing of church bells for thirty minutes. After the curfew began, slaves found on the street were subject to arrest, corporal punishment (often public whipping) and detention. The curfew was instituted through polices edicts, practices and city ordinances. Curfew violations were classified under “troublesome activity” and a threat to “public tranquility”. The curfew did not apply to “well known persons of integrity” and free white-persons, though Chazkel was careful to point out the regular, though arbitrary enforcement of the curfew, as police decided a person’s social standing and race in the darkness of night. Slaves that carried written permissions from their owners were not punished. At some points during the 53-years, curfew violation accounted for up to one fourth of all arrests.

Restrictions on movement, through the curfew, did not impair the economy, and served as a means of labor discipline, and class differentiation in the use of public spaces and in the post-colonial distinction of citizen/non-citizen. Most people did not have clocks of their own, though life was structured by time, with a balloon visible throughout the city released at noon, and church bells marking the start of curfew.

Chazkel also profiled the burgeoning demand for public illumination and the growth of theatres, marking a shift towards a culture of night leisure and urban entertainment. Of special importance was the theatre Alcazar Lyrique, which was celebrated as having changed notions of taste, the culture of leisure, and contributed to the growing acceptance of public drinking alongside the growth in theater attendance. By the 1870’s the curfew became more difficult to enforce and it was dropped in 1888 with the end of slavery. The curfew can be seen as the beginning of modern policing, with its eventual end and subsequent growth of vagrancy law thereafter.

Reflecting on Chazkel’s work, one is both enticed by the rendering of the past she evokes, and equally compelled to reflect on her broader questions of the right to the use public space, projects of social control and times and states of exception. Who has a right to the city is as pertinent a question as ever in our contemporary American moment, looking to the neoliberal dilemma of private-public space exemplified during the occupation of lower Manhattan’s Zuccotti Park by Occupy Wall Street in 2011 and public debates around racialized policing practices, most recently decried by the Black Lives Matter movement. The day/night distinction in the use, conception and control of public space persists, and historical work such as Chazkel’s offers a burgeoning, necessary illumination.

David Howell, Lousy Jobs in the Rich World: What happened to shared growth? Commentary by ARC Student Fellows Sarah Kostecki and Orkideh Gharehgozil.

David Howell is a professor of Economics and Urban Policy at The New School. His recent research “Lousy Jobs in the Rich World: What happened to shared growth?” is focused on economic growth and the how workers have benefited from it. His research is driven by the following puzzle: if economic growth and productivity have been increasing over the last 3 decades during the era of neoliberal reform, why haven’t the effects of this growth benefited the majority of workers? Why should maximizing growth be the priority?

In the orthodox economic point of view, inequality is explained by globalization and outsourcing. The belief is that Skilled Bias Technological Change (SBCT) contributes to unequal levels of income shares (Howell, ARC Talk). However, in this setup there is no emphasis on institutions.

To challenge this orthodox economic point of view, professor Howell’s research emphasizes the effects of institutions on the evolution of lousy jobs across the United States and 4 additional rich countries since the early 1980’ to answer two interrelated questions. The first question is how has decent GDP growth, productivity growth, and decent jobs moved over the last few decades in each of the five countries? The second question is what is the institutional story that can be told? Howell hopes to show the decline in bargaining power for employed workers and institutional factors (rules, laws, organizational structures, policies, and social norms) are to blame for the decline in decent jobs in lieu of traditional economic explanations.

To carry out this research, professor Howell first created two new low-wage threshold measures and compares these to a more conventional low-wage measure commonly used in socio-economic research (2/3rds the median income of full-time workers). Howell’s new low-wage threshold measures are defined as 2/3rds of the mean wage of the bottom 90% of full-time workers and 2/3rds of the mean wage of the bottom 90% of full-time prime-aged earners (between 35-59 years of age). Howell then uses the two new low-wage measures to create the lousy jobs measure defined as low-wages plus those individuals working involuntarily part-time. He then showed descriptive results using these measures for the United States.

Interestingly, the alterative low-wage measures show the cut offs for individuals earning low wages should actually be much higher in the past 3 decades than those calculated using the more conventional measure utilized by the OECD, IMF and others. Particularly for the year 2014, for example, Howell’s new low-wage cut off defined as 2/3rds of the mean for the bottom 90% of full-time prime-aged earners, show that jobs defined as low-wage in the United States should be nearly 16 dollars versus the 12 dollar threshold obtain using the conventional measure. Overall, with these findings professor Howell shows that a much higher share of working men and women have been earning low wages over the last three decades than previous studies have shown.

Utilizing the lousy jobs measure, professor Howell highlights several interesting findings. The first is a tale of convergence. In the United States, women have typically held a higher share of lousy jobs since 1979, but men are catching up. Howell shows, for example, that around 50% of women held lousy jobs in 1979 compared to 45% in 2014. Around 20% of men held lousy jobs in 1979 compared to 35% in 2014. Moreover, professor Howell shows the share of prime-aged men with lousy jobs has been increasing steadily over the last 3 decades to converge with that of prime-aged women, especially for those without a college degree. In 1979 around 15% of low educated prime-age men held lousy jobs, compared with 32% in 2014. Nearly 50% of low educated prime-aged women held lousy jobs in 1979, and after declining slightly, rose to the same levels in 2014.

Perhaps most strikingly, professor Howell shows that in 2014, men and women in lousy jobs with a high education had similar median wages to those with low education. Wages for men and women ages 18-34 with a high education were around 11 USD an hour, while wages for men with a low education were around 10 USD an hour and a little more than 9 USD an hour for women. For prime-aged workers the numbers are even more similar. Median wages for men and women with high education were around 11 USD and hour, while median wages for men with low education was right under 11 USD and around 10.50 for women.

Professor Howell’s innovative study should continue to shed more light on the issue of job quality and work precarity. His findings should provide empirical evidence that shows in an era of rising inequality and rising growth, the bounties of this growth did not translate into more high paying jobs. Professor Howell’s preliminary findings also show that no one is safe. Men and women, and especially those with a low education, are not shielded from being stuck in a lousy job. He also shows that once in a lousy job, wages are similar for men and women with both a high and low education – especially for prime-aged workers.

The next step will be looking at other facets of job quality, including the issue of flexible schedules (when workers don’t know their schedule from one week to the next), and lack of or inadequate access to social benefits not tied to employment. Targeting such issues will help to lead researchers toward providing more concrete evidence that “bargaining power” and institutional changes are to blame for the rise in lousy jobs.

To conclude, it is our hope that in the case studies, professor Howell will look not just at institutional changes, but the politics surrounding the institutional changes that are correlated with the rise in lousy jobs, especially in the United States. If social science research is supposed to impact policy and policy change, researchers analyzing the United States need to ask themselves what is the most effective way to do this with the hyper partisan political climate we are currently living in where money rules and issues facing the general public are often ignored.

 

 

 

 

 

Richard Drayton, European Empires and the Origins of Modern Inequality. Commentary by ARC Student Fellow Gordon R. Barnes Jr.

The Longue Durée and the Origins of Social Inequality.

In his recent talk, entitled “European Empires and the Origins of Modern Inequality,” Richard Drayton situates the existence of contemporary socio-economic inequality as part and parcel to a world-historic process originating in Western Eurasia during the Neolithic era. He argues that in examining the advent of sedentary agricultural societies in what today is the Middle East as well as portions of Africa, Asia, and most importantly for Drayton’s research, Europe, we can trace the social origins of contemporary inequality. The rise of notions of private property, increased regimentation of slave labor, and the concretization of the pater familias as part of social-economic relations are all a part of this lengthy process. The wide ranging talk covered various world events and socio-economic processes from the Neolithic period up until the U.S. led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. In moving away from, and indeed critiquing, the standardized approach to historical inquiry – that of area study or national narrative – Drayton’s research posits that understanding the global is necessary to understand the local, and vice versa.

In breaking up the history of inequality into three overarching periods, beginning with the rise of the latifundium currently situated in an era of collaborative management (neoliberalism being just a moment in the late stage of this third period), Drayton wants us to consider the substantial social continuities that have persisted over time and space. With this global and transnational framework as the point of departure for studying, analyzing, and understanding inequality (historical in addition to contemporary manifestations) Drayton focuses upon the rise of European imperial systems within the long post-nomadic period of social differentiation and economic segmentation. He rigorously critiques the variety of endogamous explanations for the rise of the West, whilst simultaneously delineating a collaborative network of European imperial structures. The most salient examples offered during the talk referenced Boudreaux merchants and slavers who had insurance claims with a British firm and Iberian silver merchants backed, again, by British capital. All this interconnectivity at the more personal level of business relations persisted even through the strife of inter-imperial conflagration.

This seemingly ubiquitous set of inter-imperial relations are what concerns Drayton, as it represents what he terms as the “reconstitution of inequality transnationally.” In addition to an historical understanding of inequality, Drayton offers us something to think about relative to recent interrogations of the current state of inequality in the world. Offering two frameworks from which to understand contemporary inequality, the first a set of liberal welfare arguments (national) and the second as derived from colonial experiences (international), Drayton clearly sides, analytically at least, with the latter. Taking issue with Simon Kuznets’ and, more recently, Thomas Piketty’s work (their research utilizes the first framework) Drayton was able to effectively demonstrate the paucity of reliable data gleaned from uniquely national studies of inequality. Noting that Piketty’s work posits capital as a “thing” rather than as a social relation, Drayton further reinforces the problem of provincialized studies which do not reckon with global process. Thus, for Drayton not only as a materialist world historian, but as someone who is critically engaged with the phenomena of inequality, reckoning with the effects of the longue durée is necessary if we are to be able to effectively understand the multilayered and varied ways in which social and economic inequality has persisted over time, well into the modern epoch.

Naomi Murakawa, The Perils of Police Reform. Commentary by ARC Student Fellow Douaa Sheet

In this talk, as part of her broader research on 21st century policing and the politics of carceral expansion, Naomi Murakawa discusses the contemporary developments in the ongoing process of police professionalization. She examines the history of police professionalization through a focus on some of its key discursive terms. The conceptual principle she investigates here is “procedural justice”, as the corner stone of these reforms. Murakawa is interested in how the concept is operationalized: what does “procedural justice” actually look like? She looks at incarceration rates as well as admission rates with attention to the enduring racial stratification. She traces continuities in Obama and Johnson’s speeches, in an attempt to trace antecedents of “procedural justice” as well as what is particular to the current reforms. She also examines the training modules and policing textbooks noting the language used where “listening”, “understanding their perspective”, and “respect” are some of the approaches being pushed for.

Murakawa’s argument is that procedural justice is an effort to secure poor people’s consent to their own dispossession, and to diffuse the potential for collective mobilization. What is being obscured, she argues, are the “substance” of policing, the scale (the number of officers employed and the numbers of people being arrested), the scope, and the routine baseline violence (as opposed to extreme violence). She asserts that this is not the story of good intentions with unintended consequences. Murakawa’s concern here is the reproduction of inequality through these police reforms that ironically are called for often in the name of racial fairness. She asks: what political possibilities are enabled and what critiques are constrained when we use this kind of vocabulary?

Murakawa’s questions are very timely particularly with ongoing manifestations of police brutality, as of recently Ferguson, which she also discusses in this talk. The question however is how is this discourse that she traces in books, police guidelines, and political statements translating on the ground? How are officers responding to these texts? What happens in the translation process? The textbooks certainly reveal the meta-discourse. She shows how the textbook language is consistently echoed in political speeches such as that of the police chief and the president. Murakawa mentions in passing a police officer saying to a fresh addition to the team: “forget everything you learned in these books.” Perhaps a look at what happens outside the textbooks, as these officers deal with actual situations (conflict within their teams on levels of brutality deemed necessary, being from the community where they work, members having been exposed to these new guidelines working with older generations, etc.) may help us understand even more comprehensively the ways in which these police reforms gain such force.